[PAA-Discuss] [L-R-Converg] Making the case for a first strike

[Jimmy Dunne]

Barry, USA should NOT do a first strike on N. Korea under any
circumstances.  That could start a nuclear war that would kill millions of
innocents.  If NK strikes another country then we should retaliate.
Jimmy

On Fri, Dec 22, 2017 at 9:54 AM, Barry Klein <gov.reform.pro at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
> (Is it any wonder North Korea has trouble being taken seriously? NK must
> take steps to shrink the hats of its army officers if it expects to join
> the community of nations.)
>
> Friends,
>
> The author war-games how a preemptive strike at NK can be done. We can bet
> the Trump White House is looking at this.
>
> — Barry
>
> https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/
> limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due
>
>
> Limited Strikes on North Korea Are Past Due
>  134  11
>
>   33
> Print <https://www.usni.org/print/92451>
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12>
>
> As North Korea inches ever closer to having the ability to strike the
> United States with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, President Donald Trump
> has warned Pyongyang’s leaders “not to try the United States.” [i]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_edn1>His
> speech before the South Korean parliament, combined with his previous
> threat to respond to North Korean provocations with “fire and fury,”
> created a frenzy among much of the foreign policy establishment. The Trump
> administration’s approach to this crisis has led to widespread speculation
> that the United States is preparing to conduct preemptive strikes against
> North Korea, with “devastating consequences.” [ii]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_edn2>But
> the costs of failing to preempt North Korean aggression could prove equally
> destructive.
>
> *Deterrence Requires Rational Behavior *
>
> Many defense leaders and foreign policy experts have warned that the
> United States “ should not punch first in North Korea
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-09/united-states-should-not-punch-first-korea>
> .” [iii]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_edn3>They
> fear any U.S. military action against Pyongyang will trigger a calamitous
> war on the peninsula and could set off a wider military confrontation with
> China. Instead, they maintain, Washington should continue to pursue a
> diplomatic solution centered on convincing China to restrain its longtime
> ally. Should that fail, the implication is that the only sensible
> alternative will be to rely on deterrence—as did the United States with the
> Soviet Union. These experts contend that the United States must simply
> learn to live under the shadow of a North Korean bomb.
>
> Whether North Korea can be deterred is a pivotal unanswered question. The
> trouble is that many of the same experts who are calling for the United
> States to lean on diplomacy and deterrence also say that Kim Jong Un “is
> not rational.” [iv]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_edn4>These
> leaders either failed or have forgotten their basic political science
> courses on deterrence. Renowned Harvard Professor Graham Allison explains
> in his  *Essence of Decision *(Little Brown, 1971) why deterrent
> strategies require rational decision makers to succeed. In practice,
> Allison’s theories have proven right time and again. The success or failure
> of the U.S. North Korean policy hinges almost completely on the rationality
> of the North Korean regime.
>
> Those who call for diplomatic solutions and a posture to deter North
> Korean aggression while at the same time calling out Pyongyang’s conduct as
> irrational cannot have it both ways. Allison and others argue that Kim is
> rational, although erratic. [v]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_edn5>Allison
> goes on to claim that if confronted even with limited military strikes, the
> North Korean dictator would unleash a suicidal war on the peninsula. This
> is hardly a rational response to measured U.S. military action.
>
> The truth is, nobody knows for sure whether Kim is a “crazy fat kid” [vi]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_edn6>or
> a rational actor cleverly playing to his regime elites’ notion of their
> nation’s best interest. The distinction, however, is critical. Since no one
> knows for sure, the only way to absolutely discern the true nature of North
> Korea’s provocative decisions may be to gauge the regime’s response to
> limited military action.
>
> *Break the Provocation Cycle *
>
> The North Korean conundrum has been made more difficult by decades of
> muted responses to Pyongyang’s persistent provocations. The U.S. failure to
> confront North Korea with anything more than diplomatic and economic sticks
> and carrots has emboldened the regime to become increasingly bellicose.
> Limited military action would serve the dual purpose of hampering North
> Korean nuclear progress and resetting the level of U.S. tolerance for
> Pyongyang’s belligerence.
>
> Since the Armistice Agreement in 1953, North Korean provocations have
> followed a familiar cycle:
>
> ►   A seemingly insincere gesture of goodwill by North Korea
>
> ►   Rejection of the disingenuous gesture by the international community
>
> ►   Intense, bellicose threats of action
>
> ►   Limited acts of aggression
>
> ►   International outrage followed by a cooling-down period (sometimes
> precipitated by international concessions) before starting the whole cycle
> over again
>
> In recent times the frequency of this cycle has increased, and the
> provocative acts—such as the sinking of the South Korean corvette ROKS
> *Cheonan  *and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island—have become much more
> belligerent. North Korea has come to rely on U.S. inaction following any
> level of provocation. The rational explanation for North Korea’s hyperbolic
> rhetoric followed by limited acts of aggression, ranging from shelling and
> missile launches to nuclear tests, is that the regime hopes to deter the
> United States from pursuing a preemptive attack while using these
> confrontations to fuel the anti-Americanism that underpins the regime’s
> internal legitimacy.
>
> It is possible that Kim’s behavior, while bellicose, is not only rational
> but effective. By perpetuating the myth that any U.S. military response to
> Pyongyang’s provocations will trigger an all-out war on the Korean
> Peninsula, the North Koreans have been able to deter the United States and
> buy decades of time to build up their nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
> programs.
>
> Rational or not, it is time for the United States to devise a strategy to
> break the North Korean provocation cycle. As former Secretary of State
> Henry Kissinger put it, “Pyongyang must not be left with the impression
> that it can trade time for procedure and envelop purpose in tactics as a
> way to stall and thus fulfill its long-held aspirations.” [vii]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_edn7>
>
> Kissinger, like many others, would prefer a solution brokered by the
> Chinese.  Unfortunately, China is either unwilling or unable to restrain
> Pyongyang. At the same time, there is little evidence that China will alter
> its perennial propensity to favor North Korea in its disputes with the
> United States. But that does not mean that China would risk war to
> retaliate against limited U.S. strikes on its neighbor.
>
> Allison and others warn that action against North Korea might cause the
> United States and China to slip into Thucydides’ trap: the idea that war is
> likely whenever a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one. [viii]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_edn8>This
> position misses the facts that China is cautious and that it understands it
> is not yet able to confront the U.S. military directly. Therefore, it is
> unlikely that Beijing would risk it all by overreacting to limited U.S.
> strikes on the northern peninsula.
>
> China’s failure to taper North Korea’s belligerence and Pyongyang’s rapid
> drive toward nuclear armament and missile deployments suggest  it is time
> to accept that diplomacy has run its course. Repeated failures to respond
> to North Korean provocations are only making the situation worse. The
> moment has come to launch measured preemptive strikes to roll back at least
> partially North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs.
>
> *Escalate to Deescalate *
>
> Limited strikes should be targeted carefully and focused on North Korea’s
> specific provocation. A good start would be to take out the next North
> Korean intercontinental test missile on its launch pad. Before making such
> a preemptive strike, however, careful consultation with allies,
> particularly South Korea and Japan, would be essential. Controlling
> escalation would require the adept execution of sound tactical and
> strategic plans that had already been established.
>
> In the wake of such strikes, Kim likely would feel compelled to act. If
> rational, he would respond in ways that would  not promote a wider war.
> Especially because this is an unknown factor, it would be wise to prepare
>  for cyber and maritime aggressions similar to his more serious
> provocations in 2010. Such planning would dovetail with the development of
> sound preplanned responses to  increase the odds of  U.S. military success
> at this “escalate to deescalate” strategy. The nature of North Korea’s
> reaction to military strikes—rational or irrational—would shape U.S. and
> its allies’ policies to protect their citizens.
>
> Even those who contend that the United States should learn to live with
> the North Korean bomb should support limited strikes. If Kim can be
> deterred, as they suggest, he will react in a way that risks few lives and
> leaves him options to preserve his precious regime. But if a limited
> military move against North Korea prompts an irrational shelling of Seoul
> and a wider war on the peninsula, then it is better to find out sooner than
> later. The only thing worse than a devastating war on the Korean Peninsula
> today is a war against an irrationally behaving, nuclear-armed North Korea
> capable of demolishing Honolulu, Tokyo, and Tumon tomorrow.
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> [i]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_ednref1>Kevin
> Liptak, “Trump Tell North Korea: ‘Do Not Try Us,’” CNN Politics, 8 November
> 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/11/07/politics/president-donald-
> trump-south-korean-addr...
> <http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/07/politics/president-donald-trump-south-korean-address/index.html>
>
> [ii]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_ednref2>Sara
> Malm, “NATO Warns of ‘Devastating Consequences’ if Trump Carries Out a
> Military Intervention in North Korea,” 13 October 2017, DailyMail, *www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4977850/NATO-warns-devastating-consequences-war-Korea.html
> <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4977850/NATO-warns-devastating-consequences-war-Korea.html> *
>
> [iii]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_ednref3>CDR
> George Capen, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “The United States Should Not Punch First
> in Korea,”  *Proceedings Today *, 12 September 2017,
> www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-09/united-
> states-should-not-punc...
> <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-09/united-states-should-not-punch-first-korea>
> .
>
> [iv]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_ednref4>Sandy
> Fitzgerald, “Former Joint Chiefs Mullen: Trump Rhetoric Limiting Options,”
> NewsMax, 13 August 2017,  www.newsmax.com/Politics/muellen-trump-
> rhetoric-limits/2017/08/13/id/807...
> <https://www.newsmax.com/Politics/muellen-trump-rhetoric-limits/2017/08/13/id/807355/>
> .
>
> [v]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_ednref5>Graham
> Allison, “Thinking the Unthinkable with North Korea,”  *The New York
> Times *, 30 May 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/opinion/north-korea-
> nuclear-crisis-donald-tru...
> <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/opinion/north-korea-nuclear-crisis-donald-trump.html>
> .
>
> [vi]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_ednref6>Mallory
> Shelbourne, “McCain Calls North Korean Leader a ‘Crazy, Fat Kid,'” The
> Hill, 22 March 2017, thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/325338-mccain-
> calls-north-korean-leader-a-crazy-fat-kid.
>
> [vii]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_ednref7>Henry
> A. Kissinger, “How to Resolve North Korea,”  *The Wall Street Journal *,
> 11 August 2017, www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-resolve-the-north-
> korea-crisis-1502489292
> <http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-resolve-the-north-korea-crisis-1502489292>
> .
>
> [viii]
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-12/limited-strikes-north-korea-are-past-due#_ednref8>Graham
> Allison, “Can North Korea Drag the U.S. and China into War?”  *The
> Atlantic *, 11 September 2017,  www.theatlantic.com/
> international/archive/2017/09/north-korea-us-china/5...
> <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/north-korea-us-china/539364/>
> .
> ------------------------------
>
> *Captain Adams *retired in September 2016. He commanded Provincial
> Reconstruction Team Khost, Afghanistan; USS  *Santa Fe *(SSN-763); and
> USS *Georgia *(SSGN-729B). He also was Director, Commander’s Initiatives
> Group, U.S. Seventh Fleet, where he led a team to formulate solutions to
> some of the nation’s most difficult Pacific warfighting challenges.
>
> For more great  *Proceedings *content, click  *here *
> <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings>.
>
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